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Bilateral Investment Treaties, Holdout Investors, and
their Impact on Grenada's Sovereign Debt Crisis
Alison Wirtz*
Abstract
In response to sovereign debt defaults in recent years, investors have pursued a number of
novel legal strategies in national courts and international tribunals to maximize their payouts
from the defaulted bonds. Many developing countries that raise capital through the issuance of
sovereign debt have also entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with the U.S. and
other developed countries. BITs encourage foreign investment in developing countries by
providing certain protections for investors, which in turn lower the risk of the investment. In the
event of a dispute with a foreign investor, BITs Ojpicaly provide that the parties may file suit in
a designated forum, often the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). Recently, investors have refused to paticipate in countries' restructuring efforts and
instead used BIT claims to ty to extract higherpayouts from defaulted bonds through ICSID
proceedings. Greater ICSID involvement in sovereign debt restructuring is problematic; it is
likely to increase the cost of raising capital through sovereign debt issuances and the costs of
restructuring for insolvent countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2009 global financial crisis a number of countries,
including Greece, Belize, Jamaica, and Grenada have engaged in sovereign debt
restructuring activities.1 Greece has undertaken the largest debt restructuring
campaign in the world to date.2 Grenada has been dragged into the U.S. court
system by the Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China (Ex-Im Bank).3
Argentina has been engaged in a decade-long struggle with investors who
pursued litigation and international arbitration rather than settle under the terms
of the offered restructuring agreement.4 Other countries face severely impaired
credit ratings as well.' These recent situations highlight the importance of
understanding the potential mechanisms for seeking redress in the event of a
sovereign debt default.
Many of the countries raising capital through the issuance of sovereign
debt have also entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with the U.S.
and other countries.6 BITs encourage foreign investment in developing countries
by providing certain protections for investors, which in turn lower the risk of
their investment.7 BITs typically provide that in the event of a dispute between a
state and a foreign investor, the parties may file suit in a designated forum, often
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), to
resolve any claims arising from the treaty.8 While these treaties were enacted to
encourage foreign investment in developing economies, they have recently been
used by holdout investors to disrupt some of the restructuring settlements
1 International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring--Recent Developments and Implications for the
Fund's Legal and Pofig Framework, 6 (April 26, 2013), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/04261 3.pdf.
2 Greece's Default: The Wait is Over, THE ECONOMIST, March 17, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21550271.
3 See, for example, Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
4 See Ken Parks, Argentina Sues U.S. in International Court of Jusice Over Debt Dipute, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 7, 2014) available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/argentina-sues-u-s-in-
international-court-of-justice-over-debt-dispute-1407431003.
5 See Alexander E. M. Hess and Alexander Kent, Not Just Argentina: 11 Countries Near Bankrupty,
USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2014) available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/
07/31/countries-near-bankruptcy/13435097/.
6 See, for example, International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iialnnerMenu.
7 Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in InternationalArbitration, 101 AM. J. INT'L. L.
711, 716 (2007).
8 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. 1NT'i. L. 621,
626 (1993).
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proposed in sovereign debt defaults, thereby raising the risk of investment,
rather than lowering it.
Part of these shifts in the sovereign debt restructuring landscape can be
attributed to a shift in the types of creditors buying debt on the secondary
markets, including the infamous hedge funds that gamble on distressed bonds-
colloquially, "vulture funds." 9 Vulture funds have tenaciously opposed recent
restructuring processes, choosing to hold out and pursue claims in national
courts and international arbitration forums.'°
Holdout investors first pursued claims in the ICSID when they rejected
Argentina's exchange offer after it defaulted in 2001.11 It is likely that creditors
will increasingly turn to this forum in future restructuring disputes, as it provides
a viable alternative to national courts for creditors who hold sovereign debt and
reside in a country that is party to a BIT with the debtor nation. In addition to
the advent of new forums for resolving restructuring controversies, new
contractual provisions in sovereign debt instruments have emerged, including
collective action clauses (CACs), negative pledges, and patipassu clauses.
This Comment examines the effects of the growing ICSID involvement in
sovereign debt restructuring, suggesting that this current trend is problematic
because it may not streamline the restructuring process as some scholars have
hypothesized. It may in fact increase uncertainty and costs of restructuring.
Creditors are likely to forum shop under the current framework, alternating
between national courts and international arbitration depending on which forum
yields the highest expected payout.
Debtor countries may be able to reduce the time and uncertainty of
sovereign debt restructuring by revising certain contractual provisions or
developing novel restructuring strategies that are likely to minimize litigation or
arbitration. International organizations, including the U.N. and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have advocated a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM), which has the potential to further streamline the sovereign debt
restructuring process.
This Comment proceeds in the following six sections. Section II provides
background information on sovereign debt restructuring. Sections III and IV
examine the recent trend emerging in the last decade for creditors to pursue
international arbitration through ICSID, or litigation in the U.S., rather than
accept the terms of an exchange offer. Section V discusses potential solutions
9 See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinksi, Grenada's Innovations, 4 J. INT'L BANKING & REG. 227,
229 (2006).
10 See id.
H See Elie Norton, International Investment Arbitraion and the European Debt Crisis, 13 CHI. J. INT'L L.
291, 292 (2012).
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and Section VI describes Grenada's recent selective default and restructuring.
Section VII discusses the consequences that an increased threat of holdout
litigation and arbitration may have on the terms of Grenada's restructuring and
that of future debtor countries. This Comment ultimately suggests that debtor
countries should draft bonds with revised paripassu clauses, CACS, and negative
pledges to maximize specificity in the drafting phase and minimize later disputes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Access to credit is important for developed and developing nations alike, as
sovereign debt often bridges the gap between tax revenue and government
spending to provide its citizens with necessities and pursue fiscal growth
strategies.' 2 For developing countries especially, external debt can be used to
finance defense and social programs, such as education and welfare. 3 Through
these investments, countries can build an educated and specialized workforce,
improve social welfare, and ultimately raise their standard of living and
economic outlook.14 Consequently, access to the international capital markets is
crucial for developing nations looking to maximize their long-term economic
growth.'" Just as with a private debtor, sovereign debtors are then obligated to
repay the outstanding debt in accordance with a fixed maturity schedule.16
While private entities facing an unsustainable debt obligation can discharge
debt through bankruptcy proceedings or an orderly restructuring process,17 the
same is not true of sovereign debtors. 8 Facing unsustainable obligations,
countries typically default and engage in restructuring through a variety of
techniques designed to change the debt's original payment terms.' 9 There is no
12 John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina and Solutions to the
Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1679 (2014).
13 See id. at 1679 n.40.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 1679 (citing R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay & Guido Sandleris, Sovereign Borrowing bj
Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access? 4 (JMF Working Paper No. WP/04/221, 2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04221.pd).
16 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankrupty Reorganization Approach, 85
CORNEuLL L. REV. 956, 958 (2000).
17 See Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the
Bankrupty Reorganization Process, 2005 CoL. Bus. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2005).
18 See Muse-Fisher, supra note 12, at 1680.
19 See id.
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standard international protocol for states to use when restructuring their
sovereign debt.
Debtor countries may employ a variety of restructuring mechanisms."i The
most common way to restructure sovereign debt is via a bond exchange-
commonly known as an exchange offer-where investors are offered new bonds
in exchange for the old instruments on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.21 The three
main remedies at a sovereign's disposal when engaging in restructuring are: (1)
"rescheduling," a term for deferment of either interest payments or the principal
on the old debt; (2) a "coupon reduction," meaning a reduction in the rate of
interest payable on the old debt; and (3) a "principal haircut"-that is, reducing
the principal outstanding on the old debt.22 These remedies are often used in
some combination with one another, and are by no means mutually exclusive. 23
In choosing which combination of these three options will be most effective, a
country will often balance the magnitude of the needed debt relief against the
affected creditors' preferences and propensity to hold OUt.
24
If creditors do not accept the terms of the exchange offer, they can hold
out and sue for full repayment or simply hope for repayment under the original
instruments.25 Simply waiting to be paid is a risky strategy, as the old debt can be
subordinated to the new, restructured debt. 26 For example, in its 2004 Offering
Memorandum, Grenada stated that it "does not intend to pay any non-tendered
Eligible Claims unless resources become available to do so. ' 21
20 It is important to note that SDRMs have been contemplated by a number of scholars. See, for
example, Norton, supra note 11, at 308-09; Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankrupty
Procedures for Sovereigns: A Histoy of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf; Steven L. Schwarcz,
'Tdiot's Guide" to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1189, 1195-97 (2004). The U.N.
recently passed a resolution on sovereign debt restructuring, and the IMF has considered the idea
as well. See U.N., Resolution on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Adopted by General Assembly Establishes
Multilateral Framework for Countries to Emerge from Financial Commitments, GA/11542 (Sep. 9, 2014),
available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal 1542.doc.htm [hereinafter U.N. Resolution]; see
also Anne 0. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IMF (2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
21 These exchanges usually "include reductions in principal amounts, drops in interest rates, or
extended payment periods, often leading to significant bondholder losses." Norton, supra note 11,
at 293.
22 See Buchheit & Karpinksi, supra note 9, at 229.
23 See id
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 See, for example, Grenada Offer to Exchange, Offering Memorandum 18 (Sep. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/GrenadaOfferingMemo.pdf.
27 Id.
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However, pursuing "holdout litigation" is also a risky strategy, due to
potential sovereign immunity defenses28 and difficulty in actually recovering
assets once there is a judgment in favor of the creditors.29 This litigation can
prolong the restructuring process and divert monetary resources from compliant
creditors as well as the debtor nation. If the minority creditors prevail, they do
so at the expense of the creditors who cooperated in the restructuring,
undermining incentives to acquiesce to an exchange offer.3" To avoid these
protracted battles in foreign courts, governments who successfully restructure
their debt have been known to pay holdout creditors under the table.3" Even if
the plaintiffs successfully receive a judgment in their favor, legal remedies for
creditors are often ineffective. Aside from sovereign immunity concerns, foreign
creditors attempting to enforce a judgment in a domestic court against a debtor
country often only have recourse to a limited pool of attachable assets.32
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Demand for more developed international investment law has been largely
driven by investors who recognized the potential for profitable activities
overseas and encouraged their governments to negotiate for protection of these
foreign investments.33 That demand has resulted in the proliferation of BITs in
the post-World War II era.34 BITs are bilateral treaties intended to facilitate
foreign private investment.35 Most BITs include two distinct dispute resolution
mechanisms in the event of a breach of the treaty terms: one for the contracting
28 This Comment will not discuss the role of sovereign immunity as a defense brought by the debtor
country. However, this issue has been discussed at length in scholarly literature. See, for example,
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Postjudgment Discovegy-Repubfic of Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 128 HARv. L. REV. 381 (2014-15); Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Damage Control,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (May 2013).
29 See, for example, Gelpern, supra note 28, at 2 ("[l1n the world of sovereign governments, immunity
does just enough work to dissuade most creditors from rushing to the courthouse and persuade
them to reduce their claims.... But unlike bankruptcy, immunity does not rehabilitate the debtor
or guarantee fair treatment of all creditors.").
30 See Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in InternationalArbitration, 101 Am. J. INT'L
L. 711, 713 (2007); see also Gelpern, supra note 28, at 2 (characterizing the incentive to holdout as a
"paradox-and a business model for a small minority of sophisticated creditors"-because
sovereign debt can never be discharged and "never goes away").
31 See Gelpern, supra note 28, at 3 ("Greece continues to pay the holders of its foreign-law bonds
that refused to accept its 2012 restructuring offer.").
32 See Waibel, supra note 30, at 713.
33 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BI-s Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'l L.J. 67, 71 (2005).
3 See id. at 71-72.
35 See id. at 72-73.
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states themselves and another for resolving disputes between a country and
foreign private investors.36 For foreign investors, BITs generally designate a
specific international arbitration forum-often the ICSID-as the means for
settling disputes.37 While investors may need to exhaust local remedies first,
BITs generally grant the investor the power to invoke international arbitration
and secure a binding award independent of any other diplomatic relations
between the investors' home country and the country causing the alleged
injury.38 The right of "aggrieved investors ... to prosecute their claims
autonomously, without regard to concerns or interests of their source countries"
is seen as a mechanism that "enables these bilateral treaties to afford protection
of foreign investment."39
BITs have gained in popularity in the post-World War II era, largely
because they are thought to provide a clear and enforceable framework of rules
that reduces risk for investors and encourages private investment in developing
countries.4" Essentially, "a BIT between a developed and developing country is
founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the
pro-Pect of more capital in the future."41 BITs generally contain the following
provisions to protect foreign investment: (1) protection against expropriation,
(2) guarantees of "national treatment," (3) a promise of "fair and equitable
treatment," and (4) transfer protection.4 2
Expropriation is normally defined as "any state action that deprives
investors of the ownership, control, and/or economic benefit of their
investments. 43 Most BITs prohibit expropriation, unless the property of a
foreigner is taken "(1) for a public purpose, (2) in a non-discriminatory manner,
(3) upon payment of just compensation, and in most instances, (4) with
provision for some form of judicial review., 4 4 In sovereign debt restructuring,
creditors may only have the choice between an outright default and accepting an
exchange offer.45 Under the requisite circumstances, both options may be
considered a "substantial deprivation" of the economic benefit of the bond, a
36 See id. at 87.
37 See id. at 88.
38 See id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 73-77.
41 Id. at 77 (emphasis in original).
42 Norton, supra note 11, at 295-97.
43 Id. at 295.
44 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 33, at 87.
45 See Buchheit & Karpinksi, supra note 9, at 229-30.
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violation of the expropriation clause of the relevant BIT.46 A "national
treatment" clause requires "that foreign investors from one state be treated the
same as national investors and foreign investors from other states,"47 while "fair
and equitable treatment" clauses have "generally been interpreted to grant
investors rights to transparency, freedom from harassment and coercion, due
process, good faith, and protection of reasonable expectations. ' '"8 Finally,
"transfer protection" clauses ensure that capital flows are not interrupted
unnecessarily through restrictive tax regimes or the like.49 A typical transfer
protection clause provides for "the unrestricted transfer of the investment and
its return, to be effectuated without delay.""0
BITs can vary in the scope of their subject matter jurisdiction; some have
broad jurisdiction, covering "any dispute relating to investments" while other
BITs restrict subject matter jurisdiction to only cover discreet obligations created
within the treaty itself.5 ' Thus, in addition to the four main categories of
provisions that protect investors' interests, the more expansive BITs often
contain "umbrella" clauses.3 2 Under an umbrella clause, the host country
assumes the additional responsibility for any other contractual obligations it has
undertaken beyond the explicit scope of the BIT. 3 Umbrella clauses generally
cover additional investment agreements that the state enters into with
foreigners.5 4 Depending on the precise language of the umbrella clause, a foreign
investor could allege that the umbrella clause embedded in the governing BIT
entitles the investor to the BIT's dispute resolution mechanisms when a dispute
arises over the contractual provisions in a sovereign debt instrument.
46 Norton, supra note 11, at 295 (citing ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LulIs PARADELL, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 344 (2009)).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 296.
49 Id. at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCETrS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf.
53 UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements, IIA Issues No. 2, 5
(July 2011), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaepcb201 ld3en.pdf. See also OECD,
supra note 52, at 101.
54 OECD, supra note 52, at 102.
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C. Contractual Provisions
In addition to greater access to tribunals and courts to contest the terms of
an exchange offer, there are many contractual provisions that may be inserted
into the bond agreements themselves to provide creditors with greater security.
These provisions often emerge as points of dispute in holdout litigation or
investor-state arbitration proceedings when creditors allege that the restructuring
mechanism breaches one or more of these contractual safeguards. These
mechanisms include: CACs,paripassu clauses, and negative pledges.
CACs are perhaps the most relevant contractual provision in preventing
holdout problems before they rise to the level of holdout litigation or
international arbitration. Generally, CACs set out the "conditions under which
the payment terms for a bond can be modified.""5 While drafters can construct
CACs in several ways to suit the goals for a particular issuance, CACs typically
contain the following features: (1) a "collective representation component,"
under which a bondholders' meeting can be convened to discuss default or
restructuring terms;6 (2) a "majority restructuring component" that enables a
supermajority, usually 75 percent, of bondholders to bind all holders within the
same bond issue to the terms of restructuring; and (3) a "minimum enforcement
component" whereby a minimum of bondholders, usually 25 percent, must
agree that litigation can be undertaken. 7 More than 90 percent of newly issued
sovereign bonds contain CACs. 8 Scholars have noted that, "as a general matter,
it would appear that where the majority imposes the terms of restructuring on all
bondholders within the bond issue, dissenting bondholders cannot succeed" on
their separately pursued bond claims.5 9
While CACs can effectively bind dissenting bondholders to the terms of a
restructuring plan, there are some drawbacks to their use. CACs vary by contract
and can lack uniformity across different bond issuances for a sovereign debtor."0
Thus, if a particular issuance has a CAC clause, specific examination of the
language is necessary to determine whether or not it can effectively prevent a
55 Stephen L. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek
Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 541 (2011), at 10, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=I 713914.
56 UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 6.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Eric Helleiner, Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 105 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds.,
2009).
59 UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 6.
60 See id. at 7.
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claim raised in international arbitration or litigation. Additionally, CACs do not
adequately address the "aggregation problem" that can arise when a debtor has
multiple bond issues headed towards default or subject to a cross-default
clause.6 This is because CACs are limited to the individual bond issues that they
are written for, and do not affect additional bond issuances. 2 In the event of
default of certain issuances, the debtor country will almost certainly have
multiple bond issuances outstanding at the same time, which can be freely traded
on secondary markets. Holdout creditors can strategically buy controlling
positions in a single distressed issuance in order to overcome the CAC
restrictions upon default.63
In the context of private debt restructuring, a paripassu clause ensures that
debts ranked paripassu will have the same priority in an insolvency distribution.64
While the notion of pari passu in the sovereign debt restructuring context is
complicated by the fact that countries cannot declare bankruptcy and go through
the reorganization process, holdout creditors have alleged breaches ofparipassu
clauses in the sovereign debt context. For example, Elliot Assoiates v. Peru6"
stands for the proposition that "theparipassu clause restricts debtors, particularly
those in default, to making pro rata payments to all creditors protected by the
par passu clause."66 It is important to note, however, that "Official Sector"
lenders (such as the IMF and the World Bank) typically "enjoy de facto priority
over other lenders."67 Even with aparipassu clause in place, these Official Sector
lenders may be able to negotiate different terms than their private counterparts.68
A negative pledge clause, known particularly for its use in secured
transactions, can be used in sovereign debt contracts as well.69 In practice, a
negative pledge "typically restricts the sovereign from granting security interests
to future borrowers, unless prior borrowers are secured on an equal basis."7 In
the sovereign debt context, these contractual provisions tend to reserve priority
61 See id.
62 See id
63 See id.
64 See Choi et al., supra note 55, at 15.
65 EliotAssocs., LA, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th Chamber,
Sept. 26, 2000) (granting the hedge fund, Elliot Associates, an injunction against Peru that would
prohibit it from paying certain creditors unless it made pro rata payments to all creditors ranked
pari passu).
66 Choi et al., supra note 55, at 15 (discussing the ElliottAssociates case).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 14.
70 Id.
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for debt holders, ensure equity across issuances, and prevent holdouts from
standing in the way of an orderly and efficient restructuring process.
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN ICSID
Over the past decade there has been an increase in the number of investor-
state arbitrations, raising complex procedural and substantive issues." The first
ever attempt by private investors holding sovereign debt occurred when
creditors first challenged the terms of Argentina's bond exchange as a violation
of BITs between Italy and Argentina when it defaulted in 2001.72 Before the
following series of investment disputes: Abaclat v. Agenline Republic,7" Ambiente
Ufficio v. Agentine Republic,74 and Alemanni v. Agenine Republic,7" the ICSID
tribunal had not been asked to determine whether sovereign debt constituted an
"investment" under the terms of a BIT.76 This trilogy of decisions ultimately
resulted in greater ICSID involvement in sovereign debt disputes, and illustrates
the current landscape for sovereign debt disputes in this forum.7
In the early 1990s, Argentina enacted a plan to improve economic growth
while reducing debt and inflation. To encourage foreign investment, Argentina
entered into BITs and enacted laws to encourage capital investment through
sovereign bond issuances.78 Within a decade, however, Argentina found itself
heading into a severe recession and defaulted on its debt.79 In 2005, Argentina
opened an exchange offer on over $100 billion USD in principal and interest for
its defaulted bonds.8" At the same time, Argentina enacted a law (known as an
71 See Susan L. Karamanian, Introductog Note to Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic: Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (ICSID), 52 i.L.M. 667, 667 (2013).
72 See Norton, supra note 11, at 292.
73 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011). To note, on August 4, 2011, the Abalat Tribunal issued its Majority
Decision, while the Minority Decision was issued on October 28, 2011.
74 Ambiente Uficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013).
75 Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Nov. 17, 2014).
76 See Norton, supra note 11, at 297.
77 See S. I. Strong, Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A and others v. Argentine Republic: Heir of Abaclat? Mass
and Multiparty Proceedings, ICSID REVIEW (2014), available at http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/
content/early/2014/01 /16/icsidreview.sitO44. full.
78 See Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Sovereign Debt Restructurng and Mass Claims Arbitration before the
ICSID, The Abaclat Case, 53 HARV. INT'l. L.J. 505, 505-06 (2012).
79 See id. at 506.
80 Id. According to the U.N. Committee on Trade and Development, Argentina restructured
approximately $62 billion USD in debt. See UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 3.
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"Emergency Law" or a "Cram Down Law"), which precluded the government
from reopening the exchange offer process or entering into settlement
agreements with creditors who could have participated in the exchange but
chose not to.81 While this law was suspended temporarily in 2010 to allow for
another exchange offer, some claimants still refused to participate and pursued
arbitration in the ICSID.
A. The Holdings in Abaclat, Ambiente Ufficio, and Alemanni
Three groups of investors from Italy challenged Argentina's conduct in the
ICSID. The parties agreed to multiple phases of the proceedings, with the
preliminary phase concerning only jurisdiction and admissibility.83 To date, there
has not been a decision on the merits. On August 4, 2011, the ICSID issued its
first opinion on jurisdiction and admissibility in the matter of Abac/at.8 4 The
tribunal addressed three issues pertaining to jurisdiction and admissibility: (1)
whether sovereign debt qualifies under the definition of "investment" provided
in the Italy-Argentina BIT; (2) whether individual claims can be aggregated into
a single "mass claim;" and (3) whether a country's unilateral action to restructure
debt in violation of a BIT provision gives rise to a treaty claim or merely a
contractual dispute.8"
In determining whether or not sovereign bonds qualified as investments
for the purposes of the Italy-Argentina BIT, the majority in Abaclat looked to
the text of the BIT as well as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).86
To resolve whether sovereign debt fell within the general "investment"
definition in the BITs, the tribunal in Abaclat developed a "double-barreled test"
under which the investment must satisfy the definitions set forth in both the
relevant BIT in this case the Italy-Argentina BIT and the ICSID Convention to
be classified as an investment under the BIT.8" Applying the test, the Abaclat
tribunal interpreted the definition of investment under the BIT to include
"obligations, private or public title or any other right to performances or services
having economic value, including capitalized revenues."8 It also held that Article
81 See Norton, supra note 11, at 297.
82 Id. at 297-98. Holdout creditors also pursued litigation in the U.S. and other countries as well.
83 Alemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, 252.
94 Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5.
85 Norton, supra note 11, at 298.
86 SeeAbaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 344.
87 See id.
88 Id 352.
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1 (1)(c) of the BIT included financial instruments.89 The Alemanni tribunal agreed
that sovereign debt constitutes an investment for the purposes of the BIT
because sovereign bonds had been used as an example of the kinds of
investments included within the ICSID Convention.9" The Alemanni tribunal also
rejected the argument that the bonds at issue were not investments in Argentina
because they were purchased by the current bondholders on the secondary
markets, not from Argentina itself.9
After concluding that the claimants' bonds qualified as investments under
the ICSID Convention and the Italy-Argentina BIT, the tribunal in Abaclat
turned to the question of whether these claims could be aggregated together as a
mass claim. Because Article 44 of the ICSID Convention gives the tribunal the
authority to resolve questions of procedure when the Convention itself is silent
on them, and Article 19 of the 1CSID Arbitration Rules permits the tribunal to
dictate the procedure to be followed in a given proceeding, the tribunal in
Abaclat held that mass claims are permissible in an arbitration governed by the
ICSID Arbitration Rules.92
The Alemanni tribunal took a more nuanced approach in determining
whether the claims submitted to the ICSID tribunal constituted treaty claims or
were purely contractual claims.93 The tribunal determined that there were
"separate contractual claims and claims arising under the Argentina-Italy BIT." 94
Argentina's exchange offer was derived from its sovereign power, and because
the asserted claims contained elements beyond pure contractual claims, the
tribunal held that they were covered by the terms of the Argentina-Italy BIT.9"
Additionally, in Alemanni the tribunal explained what weight it gave
precedent, referencing statements made by the Ambiente Uffi(icio tribunal. While
"it is highly common for arbitral tribunals in general and ICSID tribunals in
particular to take inspiration from the decisions of other tribunals having faced
similar questions or situations," the tribunal is not bound by stare decisis as U.S.
courts are. 96 However, the dissent in Ambiente Uffido cautioned against relying on
89 See id. 353.
90 Alemanni, ICSlD Case No. ARB/07/8, 296.
91 Specifically, the tribunal in Alemanni held that for the sovereign bonds, "the relevant criteria
should be where and/or for the benefit of whom the funds are ultimately used, and not the place
where the funds were paid out or transferred." Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 374.
92 SeeAbadat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 11 515-34.
93 See Beess und Chrostin, supra note 78, at 509.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 509-10.
96 Alemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, 255 (quoting Ambiente Uffi io, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/9, at 12-13)("Far from adhering to any doctrine of stare deeisis or considering itself
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Abaclat merely because "greater consistency in investment treaty arbitration
would be desirable."97 Thus, while the reasoning and holdings of the tribunal are
important, they would only be of a persuasive nature for future proceedings.98
In each of the matters, Argentina challenged the investors' claims by
alleging that jurisdictional preconditions specified in the Italy-Argentina BIT had
not been met.99 Article 8(1) of the BIT provides that disputes shall be resolved
through "amicable consultations" to the extent they are possible, and under
Article 8(2), only if they remain unresolved can they be submitted to a
"competent administrative or judicial process of the host State."' 0 The BIT
provides that parties may submit the dispute to the ICSID only "[i]f a dispute
still exists between investors and a Contracting Party, after a period of 18
months has elapsed since notification of the commencement of the proceeding
before the national jurisdictions indicated in paragraph (2), the dispute may be
submitted to international arbitration."'' ° At this point, the Contracting Party is
thought to have given "its advance and irrevocable consent" to arbitration.102
The claimants conceded that they had not attempted to resolve the dispute
through an amicable consultation or proceedings in the national jurisdictions,
arguing that would have been fruildess.10'
All three of the tribunals decided the issue in favor of the creditors, but
employed different theories. In Abaclat, the tribunal recast the question, asking,
"was Argentina deprived of a fair opportunity to address the dispute within the
framework of its own domestic legal system because of the Claimants disregard
of the 18 months litigation requirement?" and examined the relative positions of
the parties."0 4 The Alemanni tribunal, however, found the more nuanced
approach taken by the Ambiente Uffido tribunal to be more persuasive."0 5 The
Ambiente Uffio tribunal focused on Article 8 of the Italy-Argentina BIT rather
than frame the inquiry as one of greater consideration of fairness and
legally bound by the findings of the Abaclat tribunal, this implies a process of critically engaging
with the majority decision, but also with the counter-arguments.").
97 Ambiente Uffido, Dissent, ICSID Case No. ARB 08/9, 46, 52-53.
98 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civi'Zafion of Investment Arbitration, 113 PE-NN. ST. L. Ri.v.
1269, 1273 (2009).
99 SeeAlemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, 274.
100 Id. 301.
101 Id.
102 Id
103 Id. 302.
104 Id. 303.
105 See id. 304.
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efficiency." 6 The Alemanni tribunal interpreted the "insofar as possible" phrase
in Article 8(1) as "relating more directly to the prospect of arriving at a friendly
settlement of the dispute than the possibility of bringing consultations into
being."' 7 This interpretation departs most significantly from the Ambiente Ufficio
tribunal." 8
The claimants in Alemanni attempted to excuse their decision to simply
pursue an action in the ICSID rather than working through consultations and
local courts. They argued that it was futile to attempt to settle the dispute
through consultation, and unrealistic to secure a meaningful remedy from the
Argentinian courts based on current policies and court decisions.0 9 The tribunal
held that in light of the existing laws, including the Cram Down Law, and
Argentinian Supreme Court precedent, "the Argentine judicial system is not
•.. reasonably capable of providing effective relief,' with the consequence that a
'successful outcome is [not] likely or possible." 110
B. Further Implications
Scholars have discussed the implications of the Abaclat decision. One
commentator suggests that greater ICSID involvement in the world of sovereign
debt restructuring will prove beneficial for several reasons, such as "improv[ing]
creditor protections, stabiliz[ing] the market for sovereign debt, and allow[ing]
for more balanced bargaining during restructuring.""'
It is not entirely clear whether greater ICSID involvement in sovereign
debt restructuring disputes would "allow the growth of a healthy market for
sovereign debt-one not based solely on reputation but on reliable contracts," at
least in the near term." 2 Ideally, greater guidance from ICSID tribunals on how
various contractual provisions ought to be interpreted would encourage parties
to incorporate such language or otherwise rewrite the terms of the bonds.
However, given ICSID's view on the weight of precedent, it is possible
that greater ICSID interpretation of these contractual terms will result in greater
ambiguity as to how these provisions will be interpreted in the next dispute.
Greater ICSID involvement in sovereign debt restructuring disputes does not
necessarily imply a greater predictability for how claims will be resolved in that
106 Id. 304-05.
107 Id. 310.
108 Id.
109 See id. 313-14.
110 Id. 316 (addition in original).
M See Norton, supra note 11, at 300.
112 Id. at 302.
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tribunal. As noted in the ICSID decisions, each opinion holds no precedential
value.1 3 While the three decisions had considerable internal consistency, it may
be due to the fact that they were all interpreting the same treaty provisions and
considering the same conduct. It remains to be seen whether a BIT containing
different language in its definition of "investment" may sway a different tribunal
to hold that sovereign debt disputes are outside of ICSID jurisdiction. However,
one concern that emerges is the unpredictability of using ICSID, as it does not
follow a conception of stare decisis that investors using U.S. and other common
law-based courts are accustomed to. As investors test novel arguments and
attempt to stretch reasoning from prior decisions to extend the current trend,
international arbitration in ICSID will become increasingly unpredictable,
lowering the overall expected value of pursuing a claim through arbitration
rather than the U.S. court system.
Other scholars have criticized the use of the ICSID forum because it lacks
the institutional competence to determine the debtor country's ability to pay
following default.114 While this is a valid concern, it applies equally to the ICSID
as well as any national court presiding over a sovereign debt restructuring
dispute. Additionally, given the novelty of pursuing claims that arise out of
sovereign debt restructuring disputes, ICSID does not necessarily have the
expertise to address sovereign debt restructuring issues in an efficient manner.
Greater ICSID jurisdiction over these types of disputes may seem beneficial
because it would allow for greater specialization going forward. This argument is
tenuous because ICSID will not be able to build from a body of precedent in the
same way that common law courts can. Further, given the limited role that
precedent plays in international arbitration in the ICSID tribunals, there is little
certainty about what a tribunal will hold at this point. With the uncertainty that
still remains, it is important to consider how investor claims may fare in the
court system, arguably the closest substitute for resolution in international
arbitration.
IV. HOLDOUT LITIGATION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
One of the threats to a sovereign debt restructuring program is that a
subset of creditors will refuse to agree to the bond exchanges or other proposed
terms and pursue full repayment under the original bond terms through
litigation. Holdout creditors sued Argentina and Grenada after refusing to accept
the issuer's exchange offer for the distressed debt they held, pursuing claims in
13 See, for example,Alenanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, 255 (quoting Ambiente Ufflio, ICSID Case
No. ARB 08/9, at 12-13).
114 See, for exanple, MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVERIGN DEFAULTS BEFFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (2011).
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the U.S. and other countries. In both NML Capital v. Argentina,"' and Exp.-Imp.
Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada,"6 creditors have been able to challenge the
restructuring process in U.S. courts without being precluded by any sovereign
immunity defenses. Thus, in evaluating the likelihood that holdout creditors
might pursue international arbitration in the 1CSID to maximize their return on
the defaulted sovereign debt, it is important to examine whether the use of
alternative tribunals might present a means of maximizing holdout claims.
A. NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina
In NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, a consortium of distressed debt funds led
by NML Capital (collectively referred to as NML) sued the Argentinian
government, demanding specific performance of the underlying bond covenants
on the debt they held. "7 The central issue was whether Argentina breached the
bonds' pai passu clauses.118 NML argued that Argentina's subordination of
NML's bonds to other creditors' debt obligations that were exchanged in its
exchange offer violated the pan*passu clause." 9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an injunction that
would prevent Argentina from paying the holders of the restructured bonds
until it paid NML on apro-rata basis, and remanded the case for the trial court to
determine the full amount Argentina would have to pay the NML, among other
issues."'
Following the Second Circuit opinion, the District Court issued an
amended injunction.'2' Under the revised injunction, Argentina could not pay
holders of its restructured bonds according to the terms of its exchange offer
unless it paid NML approximately $1.4 billion-its full obligation.'22 To bolster
the force of the injunction, the court threatened contempt sanctions for third
parties handling Argentina's funds if it tried to pay the holders of the
restructured bonds anyway, potentially reaching trustees, securities clearing
115 699 F.3d.
116 13 Civ. 1450 (HB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117740 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013).
117 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic ofArgentina, Nos. 08-cv-6978 (TPG), 09-cv-1707 (TPG), 09-cv-1708
C"PG), 2011 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
118 Id. at 252.
119 See idat 251-52.
120 NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250.
121 See Order, NAIL Capital Ltd v. Republic of Agentina, Nos. 08-cv-6978 (TPG), 09-cv-1 707 (TPG),
09-cv-1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
122 W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt li'gahon, 31 YALE J. REG.
189, 191 (2014).
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houses, and payment intermediaries.'23 It would be possible for Argentina to
comply with this injunction, however, by simply refusing to pay any creditors.
Critics argue that this type of injunction "turns traditional injunction practice
... on its head" because it seeks to maximize potential costs on independent
third parties, rather than minimize irreparable harm to the plaintiff.'
NML Capital has the potential to fundamentally undermine the incentive
for creditors to participate in any sort of bond exchange or voluntary contractual
renegotiation when they could hold out and still be paid on apro rata basis in the
worst case scenario. Or worse, they could expend resources participating in the
exchange offer process and still have the flow of their restructured payments
disrupted by a holdout creditor seeking this form of an injunction.
B. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada
Following the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
opinion in NML Capital, the United States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of New York issued an opinion in Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China
v. Grenada.2 The dispute arose after Grenada defaulted on four loan agreements
with the Ex-Im Bank of the Republic of China.126 In 2006, Grenada
reestablished diplomatic ties with Beijing rather than Taiwan. 2 Consequently,
Grenada did not restructure its obligations under the loan agreements with the
Ex-Im Bank through the Paris Club 128 or by any other means, and the Ex-Im
Bank sued for payment. 29 The Ex-Im Bank received a $21.6 million judgment
with prejudgment interest but was not subsequently paid.130
123 See id. at 191-92, 196.
124 Id. at 193.
125 Ep.-Emp. Bank of the Republic of China, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117740.
126 Id. at *2.
127 Anna Gelpern, From Argentina to Grenada: Will Creditor Options Grow in Future Sovereign Debt
litigation? PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://blogs.piie.com/
realtime/?p=3934.
128 See Cheng-Yun Tsang, Ex-Im Bank v Grenada: Adding Cariy or Confusion? CAP. MKTS. L. J. 30
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2480531, at
6 n.13 ("The Paris Club is a voluntary, informal group of creditor nations, which provides debt
relief to indebted countries. The Paris Club is the major forum where creditor countries
renegotiate official sector debts.... The Paris Club includes the United States and 18 other
permanent members... Other creditors are allowed to participate in negotiations on an ad-hoc
basis."). See also MARTIN A. WF, ISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21482, THE PARIS CLUB AND
INTERNATIONAl. DEBT RELIEF 1 (2012).
129 Gelpern, supra note 127.
130 Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China, 06 Civ. 2469 (HB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137310, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2010).
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Following the success of the holdout creditors in NML Capital, the Ex-Im
Bank filed another lawsuit in the U.S., demanding to be repaid in full before
Grenada paid any other creditors on its restructured debts."' The issue
presented in this lawsuit was whether Grenada violated the paripassu clause and
a negative covenant in its loan agreements.132 Specifically, Ex-Im Bank alleged
that Grenada failed to pay the judgment it owed while making interest payments
to other creditors on restructured debt.'33 In response to these allegations,
Grenada argued that the case should be dismissed under the merger doctrine or
the doctrine of resjudicata because the court considered breach of contract claims
in the previous lawsuit.' Considering pari passu and negative pledge claims
would amount to re-litigating allegations that could have been raised in the prior
matter.135 Both parties moved for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.136
The court denied both Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the
pleadings, 137 defeating Grenada's motion because the first action brought no
claim under the paripassu clause specifically.'38 The court also defeated Ex-Im
Bank's motion because the pleadings were insufficient to support Grenada's
liability regarding a breach of the pan' passu clause and a negative pledge
provision. 131
C. Implications from Increased Litigation in U.S. Courts
NML Capital and Ex-Im Bank demonstrate that judgment creditors mayfind it profitable to assert claims regarding paripassu and negative pledges in a
later lawsuit, because doing so provides them two bites at the apple. Greater
potential for a payoff from bringing holdout claims in multiple stages may
undermine the centrality of the ICSID as a forum for the resolution of sovereign
debt restructuring disputes. With the rich body of precedent available in the U.S.
courts, creditors may choose to pursue litigation on novel interpretations of
bond terms or new theories on breach of contract, especially when the courts
have been willing to draw upon the interpretation of these sorts of terms from
the private debtor setting.
131 E.xp.-Imp. Bank of China, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117740 at *2-3.
132 Id. at *3.
133 Id. at *4.
134 Id., at *5.
135 Id. at *5.
136 Id. at *1.
137 Id. at *2.
138 Id. at *7.
139 Id. at *11.
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Ex-Im Bank illustrates a significant underlying change in sovereign debt
litigation practices to "litigotiation," or a blurring of the line between litigation
and negotiation between sovereigns and holdouts." Giving judgment creditors
the chance to pursue their claims in stages provides different incentives and
leverage opportunities."' Joseph Cotterill argues that this may not prove
problematic on policy grounds, because "[i]f all potential holdouts sued overpari
passu at the same time as seeking judgment on default, creditors who agree to a
restructuring could get snared much earlier, perhaps including before any
payments are made," which would in turn prevent creditors from exchanging
their bonds initially. 42 Holdout problems are likely to be exacerbated if
judgment creditors may interrupt the payments of the creditors who have
participated in the restructuring process.'43 However, a systemic reexamination
and re-draft of paripassu provisions, negative covenants, and negative pledges
may mitigate the issue.'"
Laura Alfaro takes a different approach, arguing that Ex-Im Bank restricts
the scope of NML Capital because the court did not automatically apply the
NML precedent.' Alfaro concludes that NML Capitals holding was largely
fact-specific and unlikely to be used automatically for future sovereign debt
restructuring controversies."' Alfaro correctly notes that the court found
Argentina "uniquely recalcitrant," which suggests that its conduct was
exceptionally egregious, however, the opinion does not define the boundaries of
such extraordinary conduct."'7 Further, it is unclear that condemnation of the
country's action affects the court's analysis of contractual provisions. In her
view, "the incentives for holdout litigation are limited because of (1) significant
constraints on creditor litigation, (2) substantial economic and reputational costs
associated with such litigation, and (3) the availability of contractual provisions
and negotiating strategies that mitigate the debtor's collection action
problems."'48
140 Joseph Cotterill, Sovereign Pani Passu and the Litigators of the Lost Cause FINANCIAL TIMES 1, 8 (Nov.
29, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2361134.
141 See id. at 9-10.
142 Id. at 10.
143 Tsang, sipra note 128, at 28.
144 Id. at 30.
145 Laura Alfaro, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Evaluating the Impact of the Argentina Riing, Harv. Bus. L.
Rev., at 32 (June 16, 2014)(unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=2451144.
146 Id. at 3.
147 Id. at 31; NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic ofAentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013).
148 Alfaro, supra note 145, at 1.
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Holdout litigation in the U.S. may pose a realistic threat to an orderly
restructuring process for Grenada given that U.S. courts appear to provide the
possibility of meaningful injunctive relief to other similarly situated investors.
Such litigation would impose significant burdens on the sovereign debt
restructuring process by adding the time and expense of trial. These burdens
would siphon resources from the creditors who complied with the exchange
offer to those who did not, thereby raising the cost of compliance and the risk
of nonpayment, even under the restructured terms. While the recent cases raised
novel questions of contractual interpretation, the scope of sovereign immunity,
and potential remedies, this area of the law is far from developed. Paradoxically,
this uncertainty may be a beneficial deterrent for all but the most determined
holdout creditors, relative to other options.
V. ADDITIONAL SOLUTIONS
A. Better Contractual Provisions
To minimize the chance of holdout litigation, countries should amend
certain contractual provisions within the bonds themselves. In the wake of the
Argentina saga, the IMF recommended that certain changes be made to CACs
and pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts.'49 Specifically, the IMF
advocated for a modification in panipassu clauses so that they explicitly exclude
an obligation to "pay creditors on a ratable basis" in an effort to avoid the result
in NML Capital."'° Both of these modifications would provide greater certainty
for debtors and creditors, and ultimately minimize future costs.
The IMF also proposed a new structure for CACs in an effort to minimize
the chance that vulture funds could purchase a sufficient proportion of a debt
issuance on the secondary market and hold up restructuring of issuances
containing CACs. It proposed a CAC with a more "robust 'aggregation"'
provision.'1 Instead of allowing bondholders to vote on a series-by-series basis,
these new CACs would invoke a "single limb voting procedure" where bonds
can be restructured as long as a supermajority votes across all of the issuances
149 Cara Salvatore, Agenina-Like Debt Contracts Need Revamp, IMF Says, LAw360 (Oct. 6, 2014),
available at http://www.law360.com/articles/584660/print?section=assetmanagement.
150 International Monetary Fund, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
COLI.FECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, 2 (September 2, 2014),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/ 2 014/090214.pdf.
151 Id
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affected." 2 In response, Kazakhstan has already incorporated these suggestions
into its newest debt issuance.5 3
The IMF's proposed CAC aggregation provision would help to ensure that
entities are unable to strategically buy issuances on the secondary market with
the hope of securing the right to hold out and pursue alternative debt collection
strategies. However, even with such an aggregation provision in place, vulture
funds could still overwhelm countries with smaller amounts in default by buying
significant portions of the sovereign debt in default and overwhelming any CAC
provisions anyway.
B. Novel Approaches to Restructuring
One potential approach to restructuring would be to impose a universal
haircut across all of the defaulted debt issuances. While this approach has not
been implemented by any country since the 1950s, universal haircuts across all
of a country's bonds in default would circumvent many of the issues that
creditors litigate over."5 4 Equal principal and interest reductions across all
creditors would avoid issues with negative pledges and paripassu clauses because
the reduction would be structured so that all of the creditors are on equal
footing. Equal treatment would also avoid one of the main issues with CACs,
the threat that creditors will buy out certain issuances in order to obtain a
sufficient amount to prevent the CAC from being triggered.
This strategy would allow a debtor nation to deal with all of its creditors at
once, rather than suffer through a long, drawn-out process as was seen with
Argentina, a process that ultimately harms domestic growth and investment. A
swifter restructuring process has real value. Due to the time value of money,
investors may be willing to take a marginally larger haircut on the principal if
they can be assured a payout in a shorter time horizon because this amount is
greater in present value than a larger payout after years of litigation.
While there has not yet been a fully litigated claim on whether a bond
exchange could be challenged on the grounds that it constitutes expropriation,
this may not represent a very promising strategy. Arguably, the bondholders
would be entitled only to just compensation, which in this scenario would likely
152 Id. at 30.
153 Ian Talley, IMF Proposes Changes to Government Bond Contracts, THE WAI.I STREETJOURNAL (Oct. 6,
2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/imf-proposes-changes-to-government-bond-
contracts- 1412609053.
154 See, for example, Jurgen Kaiser & Tim Jones, Grenada's Proposed Debt Deal Could Have
Implications for Billions of People, THE GUARDIAN (uly 1, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jul/01 /grenada-debt-
relief-caribbean.
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be the amount the bond is trading for in the market. However, the debtor nation
might be incentivized to offer a bond exchange that is at a premium to what the
bonds are trading at in the secondary markets in order to facilitate a quick and
orderly restructuring process. This could induce private creditors to participate
in an exchange, rather than sell their bonds to a vulture fund. Because these
creditors would expect fair market value of the debt, adjusted by the chance of
success, if they pursue international arbitration or litigation, the expected
payouts would not be worth the cost and uncertainty of the suit.
C. Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms in Conjunction
with the U.N.
To facilitate a more orderly restructuring process, economists and legal
scholars have called for an SDRM that would operate as an international
bankruptcy tribunal where parties could adjudicate their claims on defaulted
sovereign debt."'5 As Joseph Stiglitz noted, developed countries have a strong
bankruptcy regime to resolve debt disputes that "cannot be left to unfettered
bankruptcy" because they could undermine a fair and efficient restructuring
process.' 6 In the international sphere, scholars and institutions called for an
IMF-led SDRM, but this mechanism was never fully developed.5 7 However, in
response to the recent flurry of litigation in U.S. courts, foreign courts, and
international arbitration forums, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a
resolution "[tiowards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring process. ' ' 158 The U.N. Resolution passed with 124
votes in favor, 11 votes against, and 41 abstentions.5 9 The Resolution was
introduced and supported by developing nations and China, and opposed by the
U.S. and nations that are active financial centers. 6 '
155 See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, The World Needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, EM[ERG ING
MARKETS (Dec. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3389531/JOSEPH-STIGLITZ-The-world-needs-a-
sovereign-debt-restructuring-mechanism.html; Norton, supra note 11, at 308; Sean Hagan,
Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Ggo. J. INT'L L. 299 (2005).
156 Stiglitz, supra note 155.
157 For more discussion on the contemplated IMF-led SDRM, see IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism, (2003) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/
sdrm/2003/021203.pdf; Richard Euliss, The Feasibiliy of the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism: An Alternative Statutory Approach to Moll# American Reservations, 19 AM. U. INT'L I-. RiV.
107 (2003); Molly Ryan, Note, Sovereign BankrptS7: Why Now and Why Not In the IMF, 82
FORDHAM L. REv. 2473 (2014).
158 U.N. Resolution, supra note 20.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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The creditor nations' skepticism could ultimately undermine the viability of
greater U.N. involvement. For example, a U.S. delegate stated that a statutory
mechanism would likely increase economic uncertainty. 16 At the same time,
advocates argued that a more robust legal restructuring framework had the
potential to advance goals of economic security and foster greater
development. 162 In light of increased activism by vulture funds, the delegate
from Jamaica argued that the U.N. is an appropriate forum to consider sovereign
debt restructuring in light of its role in fostering sustainable development
because the private market has failed to address the externalities stemming from
"unsustainable sovereign debt."' 163
An international regime for sovereign bankruptcy is not without its own set
of critics. A few notable examples aside, empirical studies have shown that
coordination among private creditors in sovereign debt restructuring is not a
significant problem in most cases.' 64 In an effort to delay spillover effects of
default, ranging from bank runs to macroeconomic contraction and the
accompanying political ramifications, governments are prone to pursue risky
initiatives rather than initiate restructuring at the socially optimal time.' 65 A more
robust international bankruptcy regime still may not be able to mitigate the
political fallout associated with restructuring, and thus may not be enough to
incentivize the leaders of debtor nations to engage in restructuring when they
could preserve the most value for their countries. 66 Additionally, sovereign debt
distress and restructuring is dominated by repeat players on both the creditor
and debtor side.'67 Thus, while a SDRM offers the potential for a more
structured and orderly restructuring process, the design must minimize these
persisting concerns.
While it is still unclear what effect a U.N.-sponsored SDRM might have on
sovereign debt issuances, progress on this initiative should be closely monitored.
The drafters of the SDRM regime would need to be cognizant of the current
regimes used for resolving holdout investor claims, including national courts and
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic's Case for Sovereign Bankrupty, 50 HOus. L. REV. 1095, 1102-03
(2013)(citing Ugo Panizza, Frederico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law
of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. EcON. LIT. 651, 655-56, 671 (2009); Julian Schumacher,
Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor litigation
1976-2010, at 2-3, 20 (Dec. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2189997).
165 Jd. at 1103-04.
166 Id
167 Id. at 1106.
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international arbitration forums. If investors can select which forum to bring a
suit in, they will file in the forum that they perceive to be the most creditor-
friendly. The sophisticated vulture funds who will seek out the most creditor-
friendly forum, while unsophisticated creditors who suffer similar injury may
pursue claims in a less creditor-friendly venue.
VI. GRENADA'S SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES
In order to understand how these various elements affect the sovereign
debt restructuring process, it is helpful to examine the varied incentives at work
in a contemporary case. As a country that has been involved in multiple
restructurings recently, including discussions with the IMF and holdout litigation
in the U.S., Grenada provides a useful case study to explore these greater
themes.
A. Grenada's Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2005 and Subsequent
Selective Default
Grenada is a small island nation of approximately 100,000 people with an
economy largely dependent on tourism and commercial agriculture.16 In 2004,
Hurricane Ivan struck Grenada, destroying approximately 90 percent of the
houses and devastating both the tourist industry and nutmeg crops, Grenada's
chief agricultural export.'69 The hurricane's damage was approximately twice
Grenada's GDP. 7 '
With this type of devastation, Grenada was unable to service its debt
obligations, even though its most recent bond issuance had been trading above
par in the secondary markets prior to the hurricane.' Commercial creditors
held a majority of Grenada's debt, with other governments holding 10 percent
168 See God v. Bondholders: Small, Debt-Ridden Countries Could Benefit from Divine Intervention, THE
ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.econonmist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21589472-small-debt-ridden-countries-could-benefit-divine-intervention-god-v.
169 See Buchheit & Karpinksi, supra note 9, at 227 (approximately 70 percent of the hotel rooms in
Grenada were out of commission following Hurricane Ivan). See also U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, Report to Congress on the International Monetag Fund's Loan to Grenada: A Report to Congress
Consistent with Section 1501 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010, 3
(2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/int-monetary-fund/
Documents/7-8-2014%20Enclosure%20-%20Report%20on%20IMF%20Loans%20to%20
Grenada.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]. By some accounts, "the damage caused to Grenada
by the storm imposed some of the most substantial economic costs of any storm on a Caribbean
island country in history." Id.
170 See Buchheit & Karpinksi, supra note 9, at 227.
171 See id.
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and multilateral creditors, including the Caribbean Development Bank and the
World Bank, the remaining 20 percent.
17 2
Grenada restructured approximately 94 percent of its outstanding debt.'73
It rescheduled its obligations with creditor countries, including the U.S., the
U.K., Belgium, and France through the Paris Club (the dominant forum for
creditor countries to renegotiate sovereign debt obligations)."' This exchange
offer with the bilateral creditors only affected the coupon structure and maturity
dates of the old debt and imposed no "principal haircuts."'7 5 With private
creditors, Grenada negotiated for a new series of bonds, set to mature in 2025
("2025 Bonds"), which contained a graduated coupon structure.176
Just as Grenada began to recover from natural disasters, the global
financial crisis destabilized the tourism sector, sending the economy into
contraction. 7 7 Facing a considerable increase in the coupon rate on its sovereign
debt from the prior restructuring, a growing current account deficit, high
unemployment, and public debt that was greater than its GDP, Grenada
defaulted on payments for certain bond issuances in March 2013.178
In addressing the issue of the selective default, the government of Grenada
and other interested groups explored several potential solutions. One proposal
was for an independent body, such as the IMF, to assess the sustainability of the
debt and implement a write-off of two thirds of Grenada's debt using the
traditional Christian rhetoric of a "jubilee."' 79  Because no country has
172 Id. at 228. Grenada's commercial debt included five bond issues in Eastern Caribbean dollars, five
bond issues in U.S. dollars, commercial bank loans and overdraft lines, obligations to the local
social security system, treasury bills, and government guarantees of construction projects. Unlike
other nations experiencing financial crisis, "Grenada would have to face the practical and inter-
creditor issues raised by the need to restructure a heterogeneous debt stock." Id.
173 Tsang, supra note 128, at 5; see also Grenada Debt Exchange Offering Memorandum supra note 26.
174 See Tsang, supra note 128, at 6, n.13 ("The Paris Club is a voluntary, informal group creditor
nations, which provides debt relief to indebted countries. The Paris Club is the major forum
where creditor countries renegotiate official sector debts .... The Paris Club includes the United
States and 18 other permanent members ... Other creditors are allowed to participate in
negotiations on an ad-hoc basis."). See also MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21482,
THE PARIS CLUB AND INTERNATIONAl. DEBTRELIEF 1 (2012).
175 See Buchheit & Karpinksi, supra note 9, at 229.
176 Id
177 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 169, at 3; IMF, STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2014 ARTICLE IV
CONSULTATION AND REQUEST FOR AN EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, 4 (2014),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14196.pdf [hereinafter IMF Staff
Report]; Jurgen Kaiser & Tim Jones, supra note 154.
178 See Kaiser & Jones, supra note 154.
179 God v Bondholders, supra note 168 ("[elver since the government defaulted on its dollar bonds in
March, churchmen have called for a write-off of two-thirds of its debt, using the term 'jubilee' in
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successfully implemented a universal reduction across all of its defaulted debt
since Germany's restructuring in 1953, this proposal was highly controversial in
the greater international community.
180
The government put forth two options for restructuring its bonds due in
2025.181 The first option provided a 60 percent reduction in face value, with
principal repayments in equal, semiannual installments.182 This option also
pushed back the maturity date; the first payment would take place on November
30, 2014, and the final payment would take place on May 30, 2029.183 The
second option was an issuance that would involve a 50 percent reduction in face
value, with principal repayments in increasing semi-annual installments. 18 4 Under
this second scenario, the first interest payment would start on November 30,
2014, the first principal payment would begin on November 30, 2016, and the
date of maturity would be May 30, 2034. Interest would be a constant five
percent throughout the life of the bonds. 8 '
In order to restore debt sustainability, restore sound fiscal practices, and
stimulate private sector growth, Grenada worked with the IMF to create a plan
for the sovereign debt restructuring process. 8 6 On June 26, 2014, the IMF
Executive Board approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at
approximately $21 million USD. 18  As the program progresses, a committee
comprised of Grenadian citizens and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
(ECCB) will monitor performance and support implementation efforts.188
The restructuring process is ongoing. For foreign private creditors,
Grenada continues to work towards a formal offer for the 2025 bonds.'89 The
IMF reports that "[g]ood faith discussions with the creditor committee
its Christian sense, meaning a one-off forgiveness of sins."); see also Kaiser & Jones, supra note
177.
180 See Kaiser &Jones, supra note 154.
181 See Government of Grenada, EC$ Notes due 2025: Indicative Restructuring Options, available at
http://www.gov.gd/egov/pdf/ec-notes-indicative_restructurin-options.pdf.
182 Id.
183 [d.
184 Id
185 Id.
186 Press Release No. 14/103, IMF Mission Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Grenada on an
Economic Program under the Extended Credit Facility, IMF (Mar. 14, 2014), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/prl4103.htm.
187 IMF Country Report No. 14/363, First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement
and Financing Assurances Review-Staff Report; Press Release, 1 (Dec. 2014), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14363.pdf.
188 Id. at 4.
189 See id
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representing the majority of creditors for the bonds are intensifying, with both
sides committed to reaching a solution that is both firmly sustainable and
amicable."19 These negotiations parallel discussions with Grenada's domestic
private creditors.191
In evaluating the IMF proposed program, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury concluded that the IMF program and restructuring would provide the
best opportunity to return to a sustainable debt path due to structural
safeguards.192 However, when Standard & Poor's (S&P) rated Grenada as being
in "selective default," it noted that Grenada's political institutions and debt
management capacity were weak and that this likely would result in a prolonged
debt restructuring process. 
193
It is important to understand the structure of the initial restructuring
negotiations, including the IMF's role in these discussions. These discussions are
the precursor to any holdouts' negotiations for advantageous terms, and
pursuing full repayment through litigation or international arbitration if the
initial negotiations prove unsuccessful. Parties bargain in the shadow of the law,
and effective negotiation initially could minimize holdout litigation or
international arbitration later.
B. Grenada's BITs
Grenada is party to two BITs, one with the U.K. and one with the U.S.,
meaning that Grenada could potentially end up in international arbitration with a
group of holdout creditors.194 The BIT with the U.K. contains the following
elements relevant to a potential sovereign debt restructuring dispute: an
expropriation clause,19 a national treatment and most-favored nation clause,196
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 169, at 5.
193 See, Argentina Default may Negatively Affect Grenada, CARIBBEAN NEws Now (Aug. 1, 2014),
https:/ /www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140801131908-128451942-argen tna-default-may-negatively-
affect-grenada.
194 See Government of Grenada, Trade Agreements, available at http://www.grenadaworld.com/
InvestorsGuide/TradeAgreements/tabid/109/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2014)
[hereinafter Trade Agreements]; Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Grenada for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Treaty Series No. 33 (Feb. 25, 1988), available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1486 [hereinafter U.K.-Grenada
BIT]; Treaty between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 71-318 Washington: 1986, March 3, 1989, availabe
at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/83/treaty/1825 [hereinafter U.S.-
Grenada BIT].
195 U.K.-Grenada BIT, supra note 194, art. V.
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and access to independent settlement of investor disputes. 97 The BIT with the
U.S. contains similar clauses, including: an expropriation clause,198 a most-
favored nation clause,199 and provisions for the settlement of investment
disputes in ICSID.2"' To date, no creditors bound by a BIT with the U.S. or
U.K. have brought claims to the ICSID tribunal over Grenada's sovereign debt
restructuring efforts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In all likelihood, Grenada will continue to pursue discussions with its
creditors and reach an amenable restructuring outcome. Following the recent
disputes concerning the Argentinian sovereign debt restructuring, the future
payoffs for holding out as a private investor remain uncertain. While the recent
ICSID decisions have opened the tribunal up to investment disputes arising
from sovereign debt restructuring, there has also been increased litigation in
U.S. courts. It is still not entirely clear which course of action will be most
attractive to holdout investors, and consequently, provide the greatest threat to
an effective resolution for Grenada.
While holdout litigation may appear to be a viable alternative to
international arbitration, evidence suggests that litigation is not often pursued.
According to a recent study, "l]itigation was a factor in only 29 of the 180
sovereign debt restructuring episodes involving private creditors between 1976
and 2010.,,2 11 Thus, it is possible that the creditors will reach an orderly and
efficient resolution of the sovereign debt restructuring, given the costs and
uncertainty of litigation or international arbitration. Additionally, it is also
possible that the more favorable public perception of Grenada may also keep
the island country from becoming embroiled in a prolonged dispute with
holdout creditors. Grenada's default was due to unforeseen natural disasters,
rather than by a chronic mismanagement of finances, as has been the case in
other sovereign debt crises. Although vulture funds may not be persuaded by
Grenada's conduct leading up to its default, as other bilateral creditors might be,
notions of fairness and equity often underpin many of the rulings in both
196 Id. at art. III.
197 Id.; see also Trade Agreements, supra note 194.
198 U.S.-Grenada BIT, supra note 194, art. III(i).
199 Id. at art. 11(2) (stating that investments shall at all times be "accorded fair and equitable
treatment.").
200 Id. at art. VI.
201 Gelpern, supra note 28, at 3 (citations omitted).
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international arbitration and litigation." 2 Thus, this conduct might weigh heavily
in the expected payouts litigation and international arbitration.
The effect of ICSID's increased involvement in sovereign debt
restructuring disputes may be mitigated by trends toward multilateral investment
agreements, rather than BITs.2 °3 Many countries are discussing or drafting
regional investment agreements. These contemplated multilateral agreements
could potentially augment or even supersede BITs.20 4 In light of the fact that the
ICSID tribunals do not create precedent analogous to common law systems,
standardization of clauses for multilateral investment agreements could provide
more certainty for creditors who elect to pursue arbitration because there is less
possibility for varied interpretations of the same clause. As a result, there would
be less ambiguity embedded in the contractual terms, and the markets would be
able to more adequately allocate the risk accordingly.
A clear solution for the efficient resolution of sovereign debt disputes is to
minimize the ambiguity within the contractual provisions of the bonds, thereby
enabling the market to efficiently price the risk of the bonds (all terms included).
However, this ambiguity cannot effectively be eliminated until it has been
interpreted by the tribunals with jurisdiction over potential disputes. Going
forward, the ICSID is still well placed to interpret these provisions rather than
national courts. However, creditors are incentivized to go forum-shopping for
the jurisdiction that yields the highest expected payout. While this could
minimize the role of the ICSID, (depending on whether its decisions are deemed
to be pro-creditor or pro-debtor) with more disputes the ICSID would issue
more opinions, creating more certainty in the marketplace for these contractual
provisions.
Recent trends in international arbitration and litigation have changed the
status quo. Creditors have unprecedented access to mechanisms for redress, and
with the advent of a designated SDRM, this trend could be extended even
further. While greater access to forums has contributed to the rise of vulture
funds, further development of SDRMs could ultimately eliminate the arbitrage
opportunities for these hedge funds. Multilateral investment agreements will also
yield greater standardization of common treaty terms, allowing for more
certainty in the markets regarding risk allocation.
202 See, for example, Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 at 579 ("[t]he system put in place ... is a
system aimed at providing the disputing parties with a fair and efficient dispute settlement
mechanism.").
203 Margie-Lys Jaime, Reying Upon Parties' Inteipretation in rea -Based Investor-State Dipute Settlement:
Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements, 46 GEO.J. INT'L L. 261, 263-64 (2014).
204 Id
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These reforms may ultimately help debtor nations as well. While foreign
creditors investing in sovereign debt may have historically been at the mercy of
the sovereign debtor, these countries are repeat players in the sovereign debt
markets. Aggressive haircuts on exchange offers may save money in the short
run, but will ultimately raise the country's cost of borrowing the next time it
seeks funds through a sovereign bond issuance. Investors will require a deeper
discount up front in exchange for lending money to countries with a history of
pursuing such aggressive restructuring strategies. To the extent that these recent
trends encourage debtors to better manage the exchange offer process and
effectively deal with holdout problems, they should result in a lower cost of
capital due to the lesser uncertainty surrounding default and redress. A lower
risk premium has real implications-as the more efficient allocation of capital
can result in greater investment in the social, infrastructure, and defense
programs that are funded by sovereign debt.
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